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Abstract
We introduce a tool for analysing models of CT−, the composi-
tional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof
of Lachlan’s theorem that arithmetical part of models of PA are recur-
sively saturated. We use this tool to provide a new proof of theorem
from [ŁW17] that all models of CT− carry a partial inductive truth
predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for
formulae from a nonstandard cut which cannot be extended to a full
truth predicate satisfying CT−.
1 Introduction
In 1979, Alistair Lachlan visitedWarsaw. There, together with Henryk Kot-
larski and StanisławKrajewski, heworkedonnonstandard satisfaction classes
in models of arithmetic, and, in particular, he proved that a model that ad-
mits a full satisfaction class must be recursively saturated [Lac81]. The re-
sult is an easy observation if one assumes in addition that the satisfaction
class is inductive, but it was quite surprising that the result holds without
that assumption, and the proof was highly original. Since then, the proof
has been simplified somewhat, but still its standard presentation, such as
the one in [Kay91], involves some seemingly necessary technicalities. In
this paper, we give a proof of Lachlan’s theorem that is essentially the stan-
dard one, but before giving the proof, we isolate the part of the argument,
that can be dubbed Lachlan’s trick, and present it as a specific tool that is
later used to prove other results. That tool—disjunctions with stopping
condition—is presented in Section 3, after an example that motivates the
definition, followed by Section 4, in which we give a proof of Lachlan’s the-
orem.
The original proof of Lachlan had a reputation of difficult to follow and
difficult to grasp intuitively. One of our prime aims in this paper is to
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present Lachlan’s argument not as an isolated and ad hoc trick, but as a
clearly motivated and reusable technique.
Lachlan’s proof and some of its consequences were analyzed by Stuart
Smith in this Ph. D. thesis [Smi84]. In particular, Smith showed that if S is a
full satisfaction class on amodelM of PA, then there is an undefinable class
X of M that is definable in (M,S) [Smi89]. That result shows that rather
classless, recursively saturated models of PA do not admit full satisfaction
classes. In Section 5, we use disjunctions with stopping condition to prove a
strengthening of Smith’s theorem. We show that one can always find an X
as above that is an inductive partial satisfaction class. This result has been
already published in [ŁW17], but the techniques discussed in this paper
allowed us to obtain a significantly simpler and cleaner proof which allows
us to avoid many technicalities and makes clear the analogy to the original
proof of Lachlan’s theorem.
The results of sections 3, 4 and 5 are due to the second author. They are
a part of his Ph.D. thesis [Wci18].
In Section 6, we consider a model theoretic question concerning extend-
ability of nonstandard satisfaction classes. Kotlarski, Krajewski, and Lach-
lan proved that every countable recursively saturated model admits a full
satisfaction class. A new, model theoretic proof of this result was given by
Ali Enayat and Albert Visser in [EV15]. This new proof renewed interest in
a more detailed study of the variety of nonstandard satisfaction classes on
countable, recursively saturated models of PA. In particular, if S is a sat-
isfaction class on a modelM , and N is a recursively saturated elementary
end extension ofM , one is interested in conditions that imply that S can be
extended to a satisfaction class of N . In Section 6, we construct a slightly
pathological example showing an obstruction in proving a desired general
theorem about existence of such extensions. This part of the paper is our
joint work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we list basic technical definitions and facts which we use in
our paper.
This work concerns extensions of Peano Arithmetic (PA). All basic facts
concerning PA (including coding) and its models may be found, e.g. in
[Kay91]. We assume that Peano Arithmetic is formulated in a languageLPA
with one unary function symbol S(x) (the successor function) and two bi-
nary function symbols + and ×. We assume that the reader is acquainted
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with arithmetisation of syntax. We will use the following notation:
• Var(x) is a formulawhich defines the set of (Gödel codes of) first order
variables.
• TermPA(x) is a formula which defines the set of arithmetical terms.
ClTerm(x) defines the set of closed arithmetical terms. TermSeqPA
defines sequences of arithmetical terms. ClTermSeqPA(x) defines se-
quences of closed arithmetical terms.
• PA(x) is a formulawhich defines the set of arithmetical formulae
≤1
PA(x)
represents the set of arithmetical formulae with at most one free vari-
able.
• SentPA(x) is a formula which defines the set of arithmetical sentences.
• Forφ ∈PA, FV(φ) is a formula defining the set of free variables of φ and
Val(φ) is a formula defining the set of valuations, i.e. finite functions,
whose domain contains free variables of φ.
• y = x is a binary formula which defines the relation ”y is the numeral
denoting x,” i.e., the numeral S . . . S0, where S occurs x times. We
will actually use x as if it were a term and write expressions such as
∀xTφ(x) to denote: ”for all x, T holds of the effect of substituting x
for the only free variable in the formula φ.”
• xy = z is a ternary formulawhich defines the relation ”y-th element of
the sequence x is z.” We will actually use this relation in a functional
way. For instance, we will use an expression ac for a sequence a, as if
ac were a term.
• x◦ = y is a binary formula representing the relation: ”y is the value of
the term x.” E.g., PA ⊢ (x+ S0)◦ = S(x). We will use x◦ as if it were a
term. If s¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA, then by s¯
◦ we mean the sequence of values
of terms in s.
• If φ ∈PA, then sd(φ) denotes the syntactic depth of φ, that is, the max-
imal number of quantifiers and connectives on a path in the syntactic
tree of φ.
In the paper, we discuss models of a theory CT− and related theories.
CT− is an axiomatisation of compositional truth predicate for arithmetical
sentences. Its language is LPA together with a unary predicate T (x) with
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the intended reading ”x is a (Gödel code of a) true sentence.” Its axioms are
axioms of PA together with the following ones:
1. ∀s, t ∈ ClTermPA T (s = t) ≡ (s
◦ = t◦).
2. ∀φ ∈ SentPA T¬φ ≡ ¬Tφ.
3. ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentPA Tφ ∨ ψ ≡ Tφ ∨ Tψ.
4. ∀v ∈ Var∀φ ∈≤1PA T∃vφ ≡ ∃xTφ[x/v].
5. ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA∀φ ∈PA s¯
◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ(t¯) ≡ Tφ(s¯).
The last item is called the regularity axiom. Although it is not essen-
tial to the present paper (all theorems still hold if we drop the axiom), we
include it nevertheless, since truth theories without induction can display
certain pathologies which add a layer of technical complexity to the con-
siderations. For instance, in the absence of the regularity axiom, we cannot
deduce that T∃vφ(v) holds from the fact that Tφ(0+0) holds for a nonstan-
dard φ, since in the axiom for the existential quantifier we explicitly require
that φ is witnessed by a numeral.
We will also consider some variants of CT−. Let I(x) be a unary predi-
cate which will play a role of a definition of a cut. By CT− ↾ I wemean CT−
in which the compositional axioms are only assumed to hold for formulae
in this cut, but with no restriction on the size of terms, i.e.:
1. I(x) defines a cut.
2. ∀s, t ∈ ClTermPA T (s = t) ≡ (s
◦ = t◦).
3. ∀φ ∈ SentPA
(
sd(φ) ∈ I → T¬φ ≡ ¬Tφ
)
.
4. ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentPA
(
sd(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ I → Tφ ∨ ψ ≡ Tφ ∨ Tψ
)
.
5. ∀v ∈ Var∀φ ∈≤1PA
(
sd(∃vφ) ∈ I → T∃vφ ≡ ∃xTφ[x/v]
)
.
6. ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA∀φ ∈PA s¯
◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ(t¯) ≡ Tφ(s¯).
If c ∈ M , we define CT− ↾ c in an analogous way with a constant c
instead of I(x) and with formulae and sentences restricted to [0, c] instead
of the cut I .
Notice that in CT− there are no induction axioms for the formulae con-
taining the truth predicate (induction for arithmetical formulae is assumed,
as CT− and its variations are extensions of PA). If we extend our theories
with full induction, we denote them with CT or CT ↾ c.
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3 Introducing disjunctions with stopping conditions
In this section, we describe the main tool of our paper. Disjunctions with
stopping conditions is a propositional constructionwhich essentially allows
us to express infinite definitions by cases under the truth predicate. They
have been first explicitly defined in [CŁW17], but in fact they were used
much earlier by Smith in [Smi89]. The idea on which they are based can be
traced back to [Lac81]. Since the construction of disjunctions with stopping
condition is rather intricate, let us beginwith an intuitive description of how
they work.
Let (M,T ) be a model of CT− and let p = (φi)i∈ω be a computable type
in one variable and with finitely many parameters in the arithmetical lan-
guage that is finitely realisable in M . We will try to show that this type is
realised in M . One obvious strategy would be as follows. Let (φi)i<c be a
nonstandardly long coded sequence inM which prolongs p. For a < c, let
βa(x) :=
∧
i≤a
φi(x).
Notice that for any standard j, we have:
(M,T ) |= ∃x Tβj(x).
The goal is to show that for some nonstandard b ∈M ,
(M,T ) |= ∃x Tβb(x).
Then, using compositional axioms, we could show that any such b realises
p. Unfortunately, it is not really clear, how to ensure the existence of such
b in total absence of induction for the truth predicate (otherwise, we could
use an easy overspill).
In essence, we would like to define the set of elements satisfying a given
type using a nonstandard formula. Now, an extremely clever observation
by Lachlan which is one of the central ingredients of his proof is that we
do not have to use induction to obtain a formula which defines the set of
elements realising a certain type. Let us describe this in more detail.
Let for any ψ ∈ (M) its rank rmeasure how close the elements x satisfy-
ing (M,T ) |= Tψ(x) come to satisfying the type p. This can be measured as
follows: if ψ defines an empty set, this is very bad and we set r(ψ) = −∞. If
there are elements such that (M,T ) |= Tψ(x) and any such x happens also
to satisfy φ0(x), . . . , φn(x), but not φn+1(x), we set rank r(ψ) = n. If any
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element defined by ψ realises the whole type, then we set r(ψ) =∞. Notice
that the formulae βn(x) defined above have rank at least n.
Now our task may be reformulated as follows: find a formula whose
rank is ∞. It turns out that this may be obtained without using induction
thanks to the following lemma that is implicit in the work of Lachlan.
Lemma 1. Let W be a well order with a maximal element, let M |= PA be a
nonstandard model and let r :M →W be a function such that for any x ∈M :
• either r(x) is the maximal element ofW ;
• or r(x+ 1) > r(x).
Then there exists x ∈M such that r(x) is the maximal element ofW .
Proof. Let W,M, r satisfy the assumptions of the theorem. Suppose that
there is no x ∈ M such that r(x) is maximal in W . Pick any nonstandard
a ∈M . Then
r(a) > r(a− 1) > r(a− 2) > . . .
is an infinite descending ω-chain inW . Contradiction.
Now we will describe a naïve attempt to use Lemma 1, applied to the
order {−∞} ∪ ω ∪ {∞}, to find an element realising p. To this end, for
a given formula ψ, we will define in a uniform way another formula of a
higher rank.
It is easy to see that for any formulaψ(x), there is a sentenceαn[ψ]which
expresses that ψ has rank less than n (the details are in the proof of Lemma
2 in the next section).
Let γ0 be x = x. Then, given γa we define γa+1 as follows:
γa+1 :=
(
α0[γa] ∧ β0(x)
)
∨
(
α1[γa] ∧ β1(x)
)
∨ . . . ∨
(
αc[γa] ∨ βc(x)
)
with parentheses grouped to the left.
Read γa as a definition by cases: either γa has rank 0 and β0(x) or γa has
rank 1 and β1(x) etc. Unfortunately, this definition doesn’t work correctly.
This is because infinite conjunctions and disjunctions may behave badly in
generalmodels of CT−. Even if γa indeed has rank n (as intended), γa+1 may
even define thewhole ofM , and consequently itmay have a very small rank.
Take x such that ¬φ0(x) holds. Then still we might have:
(M,T ) |= T
(
α0[γa] ∧ β0(x)
)
∨
(
α1[γa] ∧ β1(x)
)
∨ . . . ∨
(
αc[γa] ∨ βc(x)
)
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Of course, our truth predicate will be able to recognise:
(M,T ) |= ¬Tα0[γa]
and consequently it will yield the first disjunct false. In a similar fashion, it
can yield the second disjunct false, the third disjunct false etc. However, it
will not be able to conclude that the whole disjunctions is false.
Of course, the obstacle outlined above does not prove that our attempt
will fail, but one can prove that it does using a recent result from [EP18]. It
is shown there that CT− enriched with the principle: ”a finite disjunction is
true iff one of the disjuncts is true” is not conservative over PA and in fact
has the same arithmetical strengthas CT0, a compositional truth theoryCT
−
with ∆0 induction for the formulae in the extended language.
Now, a disjunction with stopping condition is a propositional construc-
tion which allows us to do exactly what we have failed to do in our naïve
attempt above. In other words, we can define a nonstandard arithmetical
formula γa+1(x) such that if k ∈ ω is the least number for which (M,T ) |=
αk[γa] (that is, γa has rank less than k), then
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tγa+1(x) ≡ βk(x)
)
.
The definition of such γa+1(x)which will be given in the proof of Lach-
lan’s theorem in the next section uses a particular instance of a disjunc-
tion with with a stopping condition as defined below. Roughly, to check
if γa+1(x) holds, we ask if the rank of γa(x) is 0, if yes, we check if β0(x)
holds. If yes, our job is done, if not we ask if the rank of γa(x) is 1, and if
yes, we check if β1(x) holds. If yes, we stop, otherwise we continue. If we
get to βc(x) without stopping, we declare that γa+1(x) does not hold.
Definition 1. Let c ∈M , and let (αi)i≤c, (βi)i≤c be coded sequences of sentences
ofM . Then we define a disjunction with stopping condition α
c,α∨
i=a
βi
by backwards induction on k.
•
∨c,α
i=c βi = (αc ∧ βc).
•
∨c,α
i=a βi = (αa → βa) ∧ [(αa ∧ βa) ∨ (¬αa ∧
∨c,α
i=a+1 βi)].
Now, we can spell out the main property of disjunctions with stopping
conditions.
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Theorem 1. Let (M,T ) |= CT− and let (αi)i≤c, (βi)i≤c be any coded sequences
of sentences ofM . Suppose that the least k0 such that (M,T ) |= Tαk0 , is standard.
Then
(M,T ) |= T
c,α∨
i=0
βi ≡ Tβk0 .
Proof. We first show that
(M,T ) |= T
c,α∨
i=k0
βi ≡ Tβk0 .
Suppose that (M,T ) |= Tαk0 . Then by elementary propositional logic for
any γ:
(M,T ) |= (Tαk0 → Tβk0) ∧
(
(Tαk0 ∧ Tβk0) ∨ (¬Tαk0 ∧ Tγ)
)
is equivalent to
(M,T ) |= Tβk0 .
Then we prove by backwards (external) induction on k that for any k ≤
k0 ,
(M,T ) |= T
c,α∨
i=k
Tβi ≡ Tβk0 .
Suppose that this equivalence has already been proved for k+1. Then, since
k < k0 and we assumed that k0 is minimal such that (M,T ) |= αk0 , we have
for an arbitrary γ:
(M,T ) |=
[
(Tαk → Tβk) ∧
(
(Tαk ∧ Tβk) ∨ (¬Tαk ∧ Tγ)
)]
≡ Tγ.
So, by induction hypothesis:
(M,T ) |= T
c,α∨
i=k
βi ≡ T
c,α∨
i=k+1
βi ≡ Tβk0 .
Which concludes the proof of the induction step.
4 Lachlan’s Theorem
In this section, we present a proof of Lachlan’s theorem. We hope that our
proof, although very similar to the original one, will be seen as less myste-
rious.
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Theorem 2 (Lachlan’s Theorem). Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then M is recursively
saturated.
Let us describe the strategy of the proof. For a given coded and finitely
satisfiable sequence of formulae p = (φi)i∈ω , we will find a (nonstandard)
formula γ ∈M such that
• (M,T ) |= ∃xTγ(x);
• for all i ∈ ω, (M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tγ(x)→ Tφi(x)
)
.
In other words, we will try to find a set of elements satisfying our type
p that is defined by a nonstandard formula γ. In order to find γ, we will
introduce a suitable notion of rank.
Definition 2. Let (M,T ) |= CT− and let p = (φi)i∈ω be any coded sequence of
(possibly nonstandard) formulae. We define a p-rank of formulae φ ∈≤1 M , rp(φ)
as follows:
rp(φ) =


−∞, if (M,T ) |= ¬∃xTφ(x)
n, if (M,T ) |= ∃x Tφ(x) and n ∈ ω is the greatest such that
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tφ(x)→ Tφi(x)
)
, for i < n.
∞, if (M,T ) |= ∃xTφ(x) and
for all i ∈ ω, (M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tφ(x)→ Tφi(x)
)
.
We can say that p-rank of a formula measures how close that formula
gets to defining a set of elements satisfying the type p. Now, in order to
prove Lachlan’s theorem we will find a sequence (γi)i<c of formulae with
c - nonstandard such that whenever rp(γa) 6= ∞, then rp(γa+1) > rp(γa).
Then the theorem follows by a straightforward application of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Rank Lemma). Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then there exists a coded se-
quence of formulae (γi)i<c of nonstandard length such that for all a < c either
rp(γa) =∞ or
rp(γa+1) > rp(γa).
Proof. Fix (M,T ) |= CT− and p = (φi)i<c, a coded sequence of arithmetical
formulae such that for any k ∈ ω
(M,T ) |= ∃xT
∧
i≤k
φi(x).
Without loss of generalitywe can additionally assume that for any i < j ∈ ω,
(M,T ) |= T
(
∀x φj(x)→ φi(x)
)
.
9
We will define the sequence (γi) using disjunctions with a stopping condi-
tion. First, notice that for a given formula ψ, we can express that it has rank
at most n. Let:
α0[ψ] := ¬∃xψ(x)
αn[ψ] := ∃x[ψ(x) ∧ ¬φn(x)],
and (to keep our notation consistent)
βn(x) := φn(x).
Then, for all n ∈ ω, we have rp(βn) ≥ n+ 1 and
(M,T ) |= Tαn[ψ] implies rp(ψ) ≤ n,
Now, we are in position to define a coded sequence (γi)i<d of formulae
of nonstandard length which satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Fix any nonstard d and let
γ0(x) := (x = x)
γj+1(x) :=
d,α[γj ]∨
i=0
βi(x).
Let us check that γi indeed satisfies the conditions of the lemma. Sup-
pose that
rp(γa) 6=∞.
If rp(γa) = −∞, then (M,T ) |= Tα0[γa]. If rp(γa) = n for some n ∈ ω, then
(M,T ) |= Tαn[γa].
Let k be the least number such that
(M,T ) |= Tαk[γa].
(In effect, k = 0 or k = n.) Then by Theorem 1, we see that
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tγa+1(x) ≡ T
d,α[γa]∨
i=0
βi(x) ≡ Tβk(x)
)
.
As we have already observed, rp(βk) ≥ k + 1 > rp(γa), so the sequence
(γi)i<d satisfies the claim of the lemma.
Now, Lachlan’s Theoremfollows immediately fromLemma1and Lemma
2.
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5 Definability of partial inductive truth predicates
In this section, we will present a refinement of Lachlan’s Theoremwhich is
also a strengthening of Smith’s Theorem that in everymodel (M,T ) |= CT−
there is an undefinable class ([Smi89], Theorem 2.10).
Theorem 3. Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then there exists T ′ ⊂ M that is definable in
(M,T ), such that
(M,T ′) |= CT ↾ c
for a nonstandard c ∈M .
The proof will closely follow our argument from the previous section:
we will define a suitable notion of rank and demonstrate that there is a
coded sequence of formulae whose rank is increasing.
We will try to find a (nostandard) formula γ such that T ′ is defined as
γ(M) := {x ∈ M | (M,T ) |= Tγ(x)}. Our rank will measure how close a
given formula γ gets to defining a truth predicate satisfying CT ↾ c. Such a
rank can be found thanks to the following Propositionwhich can be proved
with an easy application of overspill.
Proposition 1. LetM |= PA. Suppose that (M,T ′) satisfies full induction in the
extended language and the following scheme of uniform Tarski’s biconditionals:
∀s¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA
(
(T ′(φ(s¯))) ≡ φ(s¯◦)
)
for all (standard) arithmetical formulae φ. Then there exists a nonstandard c ∈M
and T ′′ ⊂ T ′ such that
(M,T ′′) |= CT ↾ c.
Let (indi(P )) be a primitive recursive enumeration of all instances of the
induction scheme with one extra second-order variable P . Then, slightly
abusing the notation, we write for a (possibly nonstandard) formula ψ:
indi(ψ)
meaning the i-th instance of the induction scheme with the formula ψ sub-
stituted for the variable P .
Let (φi) be a primitive recursive enumeration of arithmetical formulae.
Now, we are ready to define a suitable notion of rank:
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Definition 3. Let (M,T ) |= CT− and let γ ∈≤1 (x). We define a rank of the
formula γ, r(γ) as follows:
r(γ) =


−∞, if (M,T ) |= ¬∃xTγ(x)
n, if (M,T ) |= ∃x Tγ(x) and n ∈ ω is the greatest such that
(M,T ) |= T
∧
i≤n
[
indi(γ) ∧ ∀s¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA
(
(γ(φi(s¯))) ≡ φi(s¯◦)
)]
∞, if (M,T ) |= ∃xTφ(x) and
for all i ∈ ω, (M,T ) |= T
[
indi(γ) ∧ ∀s¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA
(
(γ(φi(s¯))) ≡ φi(s¯◦)
)]
.
To find the required γ, we will use Lemma 2.
As in the previous section, notice that we can express that ψ has rank
smaller than n. Let
αn[ψ] := ¬indn(ψ) ∨ ∃s¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA¬
(
ψ(φn(s¯)) ≡ φn(s¯◦)
)
.
We can also readily find formulae, whose rank equals at least n. Let
βn(x) =
n∨
i=0
[∃s¯ x = φi(s¯) ∧ φi(s¯◦)].
As in the previous section, we define a coded sequence of formulae γi:
γ0(x) := (x = x)
γj+1(x) :=
d,α[γj ]∨
i=0
βi(x).
Now, we are in position to formulate and prove an analogue of Lemma
2.
Lemma 3. Let (M,T ) |= CT−. Then for any a ∈M either r(γa) =∞ or
r(γa+1) > r(γa).
Proof. Suppose that r(γa) 6= ∞. This means that r(γa) = −∞ or r(γa) =
n ∈ ω. Then we have
(M,T ) |= Tαk[γa]
for k = 0 or k = n+1, respectively, and k is the least such number. Therefore
by Theorem 1, we have:
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tγa+1(x) ≡ T
d,α∨
i=0
βi(x) ≡ Tβk(x)
)
.
But, by our construction, r(βk) ≥ n+ 1 > r(γa).
Theorem 3 follows immediately by Proposition 1 and Lemmata 1 and 3.
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6 Non-extendable partial truth predicates
In this section, we apply disjunctions with stopping condition to study ex-
tensions of models of CT−. We are dealing with the following question.
Suppose thatM |= PA, I ⊂M is a nonstandard cut, and (M,T ) |= CT− ↾ I .
In other words, it satisfies compositional axioms for all formulae in I and
all substitutions of terms (possibly not in I) in these formulae. Is there a
T ′ ⊃ T such that (M,T ′) |= CT−?
The above question asks about possible obstructions to the existence of a
fully compositional truth predicate. The most classical result in this vein is
Lachlan’s Theoremwhich amounts to saying that in somemodelsM |= PA,
the natural truth predicate defined on formulae from the standard cut (a
predicate satisfying CT− ↾ ω) cannot be extended to a full truth predicate.
Actually, by inspection of the proof of Lachlan’s Theorem, we see that if
M |= PA is not a recursively saturated model, then one cannot find a truth
predicate T compositional for formulae on any nonstandard cut. The same
proof applies with a little additional care paid to the choice of parametres
so that all relevant formulae are in the cut I . Now, our question in this sec-
tion asks whether once a truth predicate is already defined on a nonstandard
cut of formulae, there can be any further obstructions to extending it to the
whole model.
This question may be also viewed from a slightly different angle. Smith
has proved in ([Smi89], Theorem 4.3) that there exists a model (M,T ) |=
CT− such that it cannot be end-extended to another model of CT−. In the
proof of Smith’s theorem one shows that such an extension cannot be found
if a nonstandard formula φ defines a surjection from a cut J to the whole
model (i.e., the formula Tφ(x, y) is functional in x and defines that surjec-
tion).
Now, we can ask the question, whether this is essentially the only possi-
ble obstruction. We asked this question trying to show that if (M,T ) |= CT−
and T believes all the instances of induction to be true, then it has an end ex-
tension. Notice that indeed such a truth predicate cannot display a pathol-
ogy used by Smith. This leads us to the following question about extensions
of CT−: let (M,T ) |= CT−. Suppose thatM e N is an elementary end ex-
tension. Let T ⊂ T ′ ⊂ N be a truth predicate satisfying CT− ↾ M . In
particular, we know that (M,T ) is free of pathologies employed by Smith.
Does there exist T ′′ ⊃ T ′ such that (N,T ′′) |= CT−?
We answer both questions in the negative. We will give a proof for a
general cut satisfying some additional conditions. It is however known that
such cuts may be even required to be elementary initial segments which are
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recursively saturated models of PA.
Theorem 4. For any countable recursively saturated model M |= PA and a cut
I ⊂M such that for some coded sequence a ∈M , I = {x ∈M | ∃n ∈ ω x < an}
there exists T ⊂ M such that (M,T ) |= CT− ↾ I , but there is no T ′ ⊃ T such
that (M,T ′) |= CT−.
A slight modification of the proof yields the following result:
Theorem 5. Let M e N be countable recursively saturated models of PA such
that M = {x ∈ N | ∃n ∈ ω x < an} for some coded sequence a ∈ N . Then
there exists T ⊂ N such that (N,T ) |= CT− ↾ M and (M,T ∩M) |= CT−, but
there is no T ′ ⊃ T such that (N,T ′) |= CT−.
The difference between this theorem and the previous one is that now
we explicitly require that (M,T ∩M) |= CT−. This means in particular that
any existential formula fromM which is rendered true by the predicate T
must have a witness already inM . Note that considering the special case of
standard formulae with nonstandard numerals denoting elements fromM ,
we can conclude thatM is an elementary submodel ofN . Since the proof of
Theorem 5 is a modification of the proof of Theorem 4, we will only briefly
comment on what needs to be changed.
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on the following lemma. In the lemmawe
will use certain formulas ηb. For b ∈M , let ηb be
∃x1 . . . ∃xbv = v ∧
b∧
i=0
xi = xi.
Notice that sd(ηb) = 2b+2, which will be handy in the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4. Let (M,T, J) |= CT− ↾ J be countable and recursively saturated as a
model in the expanded language. Let A ⊂ M be any set such that (M,T,A, J) is
recursively saturated. Then, for any b /∈ J , there exists T ′ ⊃ T such that (M,T ′) |=
CT− and the formula T ′ηb(v) defines A.
Since the proof of the lemma is a modification of the Enayat–Visser con-
servativity proof for CT−, we move it to the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 4. LetM be a countable recursively saturatedmodel of PA.
Let a ∈ M , let I = {x ∈ M | ∃n ∈ ω x < an}, and let (bn)n<ω be a
decreasing sequence such that
{x ∈M | ∀n x < bn} = ω.
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We construct the predicate T by recursion. Let T ′0 be any truth predicate
such that (M,T ′0) |= CT
− is recursively saturated and
(M,T ′0) |= ∀x
(
T ′0ηa0(x) ≡ x = b0
)
Let T0 be T
′
0 restricted to formulae in J0 where a0 ∈ J0, a1 /∈ J0, and such
that (M,T0, J0) is recursively saturated.
Suppose that Tn is a truth predicate such that (M,Tn, Jn) |= CT
− ↾ Jn
where an ∈ Jn, an+1 /∈ Jn, (M,Tn, Jn) is recursively saturated, and for all
i ≤ n
(M,Tn) |= ∀x
(
T ′0ηai(x) ≡ x = bi
)
.
Using Lemma 4, we find Tn ⊂ T
′
n+1 ⊂M such that (M,T
′
n+1) |= CT
− is
a recursively saturated model such that
(M,T ′n+1) |= ∀x
(
T ′n+1ηan+1(x) ≡ x = bn+1
)
.
WesetTn+1 = T
′
n+1 ↾ Jn+1, where an+1 ∈ Jn, an+2 /∈ Jn+1 and (M,Tn+1, Jn+1)
is recursively saturated. One readily checks that Tn+1 satisfies our inductive
conditions.
Finally, we set T =
⋃
i∈ω Ti. Then
(M,T ) |= CT− ↾ I
and the formulae Tηan(x) define the elements bn.
Nowwe can use themachinery of disjunctionswith stopping conditions
to show that T cannot be extended to T ′ such that (M,T ′) |= CT−. Suppose
towards contradiction that such a T ′ can be found. Again, we introduce a
suitable notion of rank. For φ ∈≤1 (M), let
r(φ) =


−∞, if (M,T ) |= ¬∃x Tφ(x)
n, if (M,T ) |= ∃x Tφ(x) and n ∈ ω is the greatest such that
(M,T ) |= ∀x
(
Tφ(x)→ x > n ∧ x ≤ bn
)
∞, if (M,T ) |= ∃x Tφ(x) and
for all n ∈ ω(M,T ) |=
(
∀xTφ(x)→ x > n ∧ x ≤ bn
)
Since (bn) is downwards cofinal inM \ ω, one can readily see that there
are no formulae of rank∞ because an element definedwith such a formula
necessarily would have to be between ω and all elements bn. Notice that for
any formula φ, we can in fact find a coded sequence of sentences αi[φ] such
that
(M,T ) |= Tαi[φ] iff r(φ) ≥ n.
15
Namely, we set:
αn[φ] := ∃xφ(x) ∧ [∀x, y(φ(x) ∧ ηan(y)) → (x > n ∧ x ≤ y
)
].
Using Lemma1, it is enough to find a coded sequence of sentences grow-
ing in the rank. Fix any c smaller than the length of a as a sequence (where
a is the coded sequence we have fixed in the construction of our predicate
T ) and let
γ0(x) := (x = x)
γj+1(x) :=
c,α[γj ]∨
i=0
ηai+1(x).
We claim that for all d < a either r(γd) =∞ or r(γd+1) > r(γd).
Fix any d and suppose that (γd) = −∞ or r(γd) = n ∈ ω. Then by
Theorem 1
(M,T ′) |= ∀x
(
Tγd+1(x) ≡ Tηak(x)
)
where k = 0 if r(γd) = −∞ or k = n + 1 if r(γc) = n ∈ ω. The rank of the
formula ηak is greater than r(γd), since ηak defines the element bk and the
sequence (bn) is decreasing. Now, as in proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, Lemma
1 would imply that there exists a formula γ with rank equal to∞, and, as
we have already noticed, such a formula cannot exist.
Now let us comment on the modifications to the above construction
needed in order to prove Theorem 5. The crucial problem is that the con-
structed truth predicate restricted to I now needs to be a model of CT−
itself. In order to achieve this, we can take every Jn to be an elementary
submodel ofM such that (M,Jn) is recursively saturated. We additionally
require that each Tn has the additional property that (Jn, Tn ∩ Jn) |= CT
−.
This can be proved similarly to Lemma 4, but we skip the unenlightening
details.
7 Appendix
In this section, we prove Lemma 4. Its proof is a modification of the con-
struction by Enayat and Visser from [EV15].
The lemma is a strengthening of a result by Smith ([Smi89], Theorem
3.3) who showed that any A ⊆ M such that (M,A) is recursively saturated
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may be definedwith a nonstandard formula. In the above Lemma, we addi-
tionally require that wemay arbitrarily fix this truth predicate on any given
cut.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that ηb was defined as:
∃x1 . . . ∃xbv = v ∧
b∧
i=0
xi = xi.
Fix (M,T, J,A) as in the assumptions of the lemma. We first show that
there exist an extension
(M,T, J,A)  (M ′, T ′, J ′, A′)
and T ′′ such that
• (M ′, T ′′) |= CT−.
• (M ′, T ′′, A′) |= ∀x x ∈ A′ ≡ T ′′ηb(x).
• T ′ ⊂ T ′′.
By resplendency of (M,T,A), this will conclude our proof.
In order to construct (M ′, T ′, J ′, A′, T ′′), we build an auxiliary chain of
models: (Mn, Tn, Jn, An, Sn) of length ω such that Tn and Sn are binary re-
lations (we replace truth predicates with satisfaction predicates), Jn is a cut,
and An ⊆Mn.
We define A0 as A, M0 as M , J0 as J . S0 is the empty set, and T0 is a
partial satisfaction predicate defined so that T0(φ, α) holds for φ ∈PA (M0),
α ∈ Val(φ) if T (φ[α]) holds, where φ[α] is obtained from φ by substituting
α(v) for every v ∈ FV(φ); i.e. we take a variable in φ, see what is its value
under α, we take the canonical numeral denoting this value, and we sub-
stitute it into φ. Similarly, if t ∈ TermPA, and α is a valuation defined on
free variables, by t[α] we mean the value of the term t with numerals α(v)
substituted for free variables v in the term t. If α, β are valuations and v is
a variable, we denote by α ∼v β that α and β are identical, possibly except
for the value on the variable v (which is in particular allowed to be in the
domain of one of the valuations but not the other one).
We inductively construct a chain of countablemodels (Mn, Tn, Jn, An, Sn)
of length ω. Suppose that we have already defined the n-th model in the
chain. Then we define (Mn+1, Tn+1, Jn+1, An+1, Sn+1) as any model of the
theory Θn with the following axioms:
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• The elementarydiagramElDiag(Mn, Tn, Jn, An) (with symbolsAn, Tn, Jn
replaced with An+1, Tn+1, Jn+1, respectively).
• The compositionality scheme Compn(φ), for φ ∈PA (Mn), to be de-
fined later.
• The regularity axiom I: ∀φ ∈PA, α ∈ Val(φ) Sn+1(φ, α) ≡ Sn+1(φ[α], ∅).
• The regularity axiom II: ∀φ ∈PA ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqPA s¯
◦ = t¯◦ →
Sn+1(φ(s¯), ∅) ≡ Sn+1(φ(t¯), ∅).
• ∀φ ∈PA ∀α ∈ Val(φ) Tn+1(φ, α)→ Sn+1(φ, α).
• ∀x x ∈ An+1 ≡ Sn+1(ηb(x), ∅).
• An additional preservation condition for n > 0: Sn+1(φ, α) for all
φ ∈PA (Mn−1), α ∈ Val(φ) ∈Mn such that Sn(φ, α) holds.
Finally, an instance of the compositionality schemeCompn(φ) is defined
as follows:
• ∀s, t ∈ TermPA∀α ∈ Val(φ)
(
φ = (s = t)→ Sn+1(φ, α) ≡ s[α] = t[α]
)
.
• ∀ψ ∈PA ∀α ∈ Val(φ)
(
φ = ¬ψ → Sn+1(φ, α) ≡ ¬Sn+1(φ, α)
)
.
• ∀ψ, η ∈PA ∀α ∈ Val(φ)
(
φ = (ψ ∨ η) → Sn+1(φ, α) ≡ Sn+1(ψ,α) ∨
Sn+1(η, α)
)
.
• ∀v ∈ Var, ψ ∈PA ∀α ∈ Val(φ)
(
φ = (∃vψ) → Sn+1(φ, α) ≡ ∃α
′ ∼v
α Sn+1(ψ,α
′)
)
.
Let us assume for this moment that Θn is consistent. We will return to
this matter later. Assuming that the construction works (i.e., all the models
(Mn, Tn, Jn, An, Sn) exist), we define:
• M ′ =
⋃
Mn.
• T ′ = {φ ∈ SentPA(M
′) | (φ, ∅) ∈
⋃
Tn}.
• J ′ =
⋃
Jn.
• A′ =
⋃
An.
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• T ′′ = {φ ∈ SentPA(M
′) | ∃n φ ∈ SentPA(Mn) ∧ (φ, ∅) ∈ Sn+1}.
We claim that (M ′, T ′, J ′, A′, T ′′) satisfies the conditions listed at the begin-
ning of our proof. Let us check it.
The elementarity of the extension (M,T, J,A)  (M ′, T ′, J ′, A′) follows
from the fact that every extension in the constructed chain was elementary
in this restricted language. The containment T ′ ⊆ T ′′ also follows from the
fact that the containment holds at every step of our construction.
Let us now observe that if φ ∈ Mn, α ∈ Mn+1, and (φ, α) /∈ Sn+1, then
(φ, α) /∈ Sl for l ≥ n + 1. Indeed, if (φ, α) /∈ Sn+1, then by compositional
conditions (¬φ, α) ∈ Sn+1 and, consequently (¬φ, α) ∈ Sl which, again by
compositional axioms, implies (φ, α) /∈ Sl. The equivalence
(M ′, T ′′, A′) |= ∀x A′(x) ≡ T ′′ηb(x)
also holds at every step of our construction and the predicates An extend
each other elementary. In particular, if x ∈ Mn, and ¬An(x), then ¬Ak(x)
holds for any k > n. This guarantees that ηb defines the set A
′ in the model
(M ′, T ′′). Now it suffices to check that (M,T ′′) |= CT−.
Let us fix any φ ∈ M ′. We prove compositionality by cases considering
various possible syntactic forms of φ. Let us consider for example the case
whenφ = ∃vψ(v). Fix the leastn such that φ ∈Mn. Suppose that φ ∈ T
′′. By
definition, this means that (∃vψ, ∅) ∈ Sn+1. By compositional conditions,
there is a valuation α defined on the variable v such that (ψ,α) ∈ Sn+1 and,
by the regularity axiom I, (ψ[α], ∅) ∈ Sn+1 as well. Fix any variable w which
does not occur in ψ which minimises k for which ψ′ := ψ[w/v] ∈ Mk. Let
β be a valuation defined only on w such that β(w) = α(v). Then, by the
regularity axiom I, (ψ′, β) ∈ Sn+1, which implies (∃wψ
′, ∅) ∈ Sn+1. Finally,
by the remark in the previous paragraph, this gives us (∃wψ, ∅) ∈ Sk+1, and
consequently (ψ, γ) ∈ Sk+1 for some γ defined only onw. Then, again using
the regularity axiom I, we conclude that (ψ[γ], ∅) ∈ Sk+1 and (ψ[γ], ∅) ∈
Sk+2. Since ψ
′[γ] = ψ[γ] = ψ(x) for some x fromMk orMk+1, we conclude
that ψ(x) ∈ T ′′.
Conversely, suppose that φ(x) ∈ T ′′ which means that φ(x) ∈ Sn+1 for
the least n such that φ(x) ∈ T ′′. By regularity and compositional axioms
this implies that we have (∃vφ, ∅) ∈ Sn+1. Then (∃vφ, ∅) ∈ Sk+1 where k is
the least such that ∃vφ ∈Mk which again implies that ∃vφ ∈ T
′′.
The regularity axiom of CT− follows from the regularity axiom II in the
above construction. This ends the proof modulo the consistency of the the-
ory Θn which we prove in a separate lemma.
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Lemma 5. The theories Θn defined above are consistent.
Sketch of the proof. We prove the claim by induction on n. Since the induc-
tion step and the initial step are essentially the same, we assume that n > 0.
There is only one thing which needs to be taken care of in the initial step.
We will point it out in the construction. Suppose that (Mn, Tn, Jn, Sn) sat-
isfies Θn−1. Notice that compositionality and preservation conditions are
given by schemes:
• Compn(φ), for φ ∈PA (Mn).
• Sn+1(φ, α) for all φ ∈Mn−1, α ∈Mn such that Sn(φ, α) holds.
To prove the consistency ofΘn, take any finite Γ ⊂ Θn. Wewant to interpret
Sn+1 in the model (Mn, Tn, Jn, An) so that it satisfies the finitely many com-
positional and preservation conditions fromΓ. Wewill introduce the equiv-
alence relation∼definedas follows for arithmetical formulae φ,ψ ∈Mn and
α ∈ Val(φ), β ∈ Val(ψ):
(φ, α) ∼ (ψ, β)
if φ[α] and ψ[β] differ only by substituting a sequence of terms with equal
values, i.e. there exists a formula ξ ∈Mn and sequences t¯, s¯ ∈Mn of closed
terms with s¯◦ = t¯◦ such that φ[α] = ξ(s¯) and ψ[β] = ξ(t¯). We also de-
fine: φ ∼ ψ if there exist sequences φ = φ1, . . . , φn = ψ of formulae and
α1, . . . , αn of valuations of standard length such that
(φ1, α1) ∼ . . . ∼ (φn, αn).
The relation ∼ is clearly an equivalence relation. Notice that for any φ, α,
(φ, α) ∼ (φ[α], ∅) and, consequently, φ ∼ φ[α].
Let ∆′ be the finite set of all formulae which occur under the predicate
Sn+1 either in an instance of the compositionality scheme or the preserva-
tion condition. Let∆ be the set of equivalence classes of formulae from ∆′
under the relation ∼:
∆ = {[φ]∼ ∈PA (Mn)/ ∼ | φ ∈ ∆
′}.
Notice that we can order ∆ by the relation E such that [φ] E′ [ψ] if there
are φ′ ∈ [φ], ψ′ ∈ [ψ] such that φ′ is a direct subformula of ψ. Let E be the
transitive closure of E′. Now, we define the predicate Sn+1 in the following
steps:
1. In the first step, we include in Sn+1 all pairs (φ, α) from Tn+1.
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2. For any [φ] ∈ ∆ which has an element from Mn−1 and is minimal in
the ordering E, we set (φ, α) ∈ Sn+1 iff (φ, α) ∈ Sn for φ ∈ Mn−1.
We extend the valuation to the whole [φ] by setting (φ, α) ∈ Sn iff
(ψ, β) ∈ Sn for (φ, α) ∼ (ψ, β).
3. For any [φ] ∈ ∆ which has no element inMn−1 and is minimal in the
orderingE, we do not add any (φ, α) to Sn+1. Effectively, φ defines an
empty set.
4. If n = 0, for all φ ∈ ∆′ which are subformulae of ηb located on a
(standard) finite depth in the syntactic tree of ηb (including ηb itself),
we set (φ, α) ∈ Sn if A(ηb(x)) holds where x = α(v). In effect, we
decide that the valuations on all variables other than v donot influence
the truth value of ηb. If n > 0, then Sn+1 is defined on ηb and its direct
subformulae by the preservation conditions.
5. We extend the valuation to other classes in∆ by induction on the finite
partial orderE using compositional conditions, e.g. if Sn+1 is already
defined on φ such that [φ] ∈ ∆, then we extend it to ¬φwith [¬φ] ∈ ∆
so that (¬φ, α) ∈ Sn iff (φ, α) /∈ Sn.
It is clear that the constructed model satisfies the elementary diagram of
(Mn, Tn, Jn, An). Since the predicateSn+1wasdefinedby induction on com-
plexity of formulae according to compositional condition and since every
formula has an unambiguous tree of direct subformulae, the compositional
conditions are satisfied. The preservation conditions are satisfied since if
a formula φ is an element of Mn−1, then its direct subformula must be an
element of Mn−1 as well. Since compositional conditions uniquely deter-
mine the behaviour of Sn+1 on a given formula given its behaviour on direct
subformulae, Sn+1 agrees with Sn on every formula in Γ which belongs to
Mn−1. It is clear that Tn+1 ⊆ Sn+1 and that ηb defines exactly the set A.
Let us check that the regularity conditions are satisfied. They are clearly
satisfied for formulae φ such that [φ] /∈ ∆. We prove by induction on the
height in the orderE in∆ that for all [φ] and all φ′ ∈ [φ], the regularity con-
ditions are satisfied. The claim clearly holds for all formulae in [φ], where
[φ] is minimal in the order E in ∆. Take any class [φ] ∈ ∆. We want to
check that regularity conditions are satisfied for formulae in [φ], provided
that they are satisfied for their direct subformulae. We prove by cases, con-
sidering various possible syntactic shapes of φ. Let analyse one example.
Suppose that φ = ∃vψ such that regularity conditions are satisfied for for-
mulae in [ψ].
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We consider the first axiom of regularity. Take any α ∈ Val(φ). By defi-
nition (φ, α) ∈ Sn+1 iff there exists α
′ ∼v α such that (ψ,α
′) ∈ Sn+1. Notice
that (ψ,α′) ∼ (ψ[α], β), where β is any valuation with β(v) = α′(v), as ψ[α]
is a formula with at most the variable v free and all other variables ’filled
in’ with α. By induction hypothesis, the pair (ψ,α′) ∈ Sn+1 if and only if
(ψ[α], β) is in Sn+1. This in turn holds if and only if (φ[α], ∅) ∈ Sn+1, again
by compositional conditions.
Now consider the second axiom of regularity. Letφ = ∃vψ, let s¯, t¯ be two
coded sequences of closed terms with s¯◦ = t¯◦ and suppose that (φ(s¯), ∅) ∈
Sn+1. Then there exists α ∼v ∅ such that (ψ(s¯), α) ∈ Sn+1. By definition
(ψ(s¯), α) ∼ (ψ(t¯), α), so by induction hypothesis (ψ(t¯), α) ∈ Sn+1, and by
compositional conditions (φ(t¯), ∅) ∈ Sn+1 as well.
Similarly, the regularity conditions hold for all formulae from the classes
in ∆. This shows that the defined model satisfies the finite fragment Γ of
Θn. The consistency of Θn follows.
References
[CŁW17] Cezary Cieśliński, Mateusz Łełyk, and Bartosz Wcisło. Models
of PT− with internal induction for total formulae. The Review of
Symbolic Logic, 10(1):187–202, 2017.
[EP18] A. Enayat and F. Pakhomov. Truth, Disjunction, and Induction.
ArXiv e-prints, May 2018.
[EV15] Ali Enayat and Albert Visser. New constructions of satis-
faction classes. In Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José
Martínez Fernández, and Kentaro Fujimoto, editors, Unifying the
Philosophy of Truth, pages 321–335. Springer, 2015.
[Kay91] Richard Kaye. Models of Peano Arithmetic. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991.
[Lac81] Alistair H. Lachlan. Full satisfaction classes and recursive satu-
ration. Canadian Mathmematical Bulletin, 24:295–297, 1981.
[ŁW17] Mateusz Łełyk and Bartosz Wcisło. Models of weak theories of
truth. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 56(5):453–474, 2017.
[Smi84] Stewart Smith. Nonstandard Syntax and Semantics and Full Satisfac-
tion Classes for Models of Arithmetic. Phd thesis, 1984.
22
[Smi89] Stuart T. Smith. Nonstandard definability. Annals of Pure and Ap-
plied Logic, 42(1):21–43, 1989.
[Wci18] Bartosz Wcisło. Understanding the Strength of the Compositional
Truth. Phd thesis, 2018.
23
